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JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND THE ADMINISTRATION 
OF CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY 
Kenyon D. Bunch* 
Grant B. Mindle·· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The utility of judicial intervention to reform and perfect 
the administration of social policy is widely acknowledged: 
Because they are sometimes more accessible than legislatures and 
bureaucracies, courts can encourage the adaptation of cumbersome 
administrative institutions to emergent public values. Decisions such 
as ... Adams v. Richardson, which require old-line administrative 
agencies to give new weight . . . to the elimination of racial 
discrimination, exemplifY this sometimes controversial process of 
judicial renovation of statutory norms."1 
Subjection to a court order may even facilitate the exercise of 
bureaucratic power by providing a timid agency with the clout 
and legitimacy it needs to triumph over its political 
opposition.2 An agency constrained by the judiciary is 
well-positioned to pacify the opposition without actually 
curtailing its enforcement activities by disavowing 
responsibility for its actions. The judiciary is not only a 
magnificent scapegoat, but the solutions it proposes to 
bureaucratic problems can "be tailored to the needs of the 
particular situation and flexibly administered or modified as 
experience develops."3 According to Cavanagh and Sarat, 
scholars who doubt the judiciary's capacity to superintend the 
administration of social policy have "underestimate[d] the 
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of North Carolina, 
Greensboro. B.A., University of Missouri, Columbia, 1970; Ph.D., University of 
Missouri, Columbia, 1985. 
** Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of North Texas. B.A., 
Claremont McKenna College, 1975; Ph.D., Harvard University, 1985. 
1. Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private 
Rights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1193, 1282 (1982). 
2. See, e.g., T. Yarbrough, The Political World of Federal Judges as Managers, 
45 PliB. ADMIN. REV. 660, 665-66 (1985); S. Washy, Communication of Decisions, in 
COURTS, LAW, AND JUDICIAL PROCESSES 479, 482 (1981);; D. Brown & R. Stover, 
Compliance with Court Directives: A Utility Approach, in, AMERICAN COURT 
SV&'TEMS 555-56 (1989). 
3. Abraham Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1281, 1308 (1976). 
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demonstrated ability of courts to evolve new mechanisms and 
procedures in response to implicit or explicit societal demands. 
They are too often content to evolve theories about judicial 
competence from a handful of 'worst' case studies."4 
But how are we to decide when a case study is typical, and 
therefore relevant to the determination of judicial competence, 
and when it is not? Is every example of judicial incapacity an 
aberration? Cavanagh and Sarat seem to think so.5 Otherwise, 
why would they try to establish the capacity of the judiciary to 
manage extended impact cases successfully on the basis of 
purely abstract considerations? Not one case study is cited to 
demonstrate the inadequacy of Horowitz's case selection 
process. But a theory, unsubstantiated by practice, is hardly 
proof of the capacity of the judiciary to comprehend and 
superintend the administration of complex social policies. 
Adams v. Richardson6 is relevant to the study of judicial 
competence, not only because of the importance of its subject 
matter-the administration of civil rights policy by the Office 
for Civil Rights (OCR)-but also because it is frequently cited 
to illustrate the desirability of judicial intervention. Adams, 
however, is a reminder that what seems obvious in the 
beginning may not be so obvious in the end. Difficulties arose 
not because the judiciary was too political, but because it was 
not political enough. It was too insulated from the political and 
administrative process to anticipate the consequences of its 
decisions. 
In Adams, the District Court for the District of Columbia 
not only intervened repeatedly to improve the enforcement of 
civil rights, but adopted a strategy which to everyone's surprise 
made it increasingly difficult for OCR to combat racial 
4. R. Cavanagh & A. Sarat, Thinking about Courts: Toward and Beyond a 
Jurisprudence of Judicial Competence, 14 LAW & Soc'¥ REV. 371, 378 (1980) (citing 
D. Horowitz, The Courts as Guardians of the Public Interest, 37 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 
1294 (1977)). 
fi. Id. at 403-11. 
6. Adams v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 636 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Adams has gone 
through many name changes in its history as evidenced by the following list: 
Women's Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Adams 
v. Bennett, 67fi F. Supp. 668 (D.C. Cir. 1987) rev'd sub nom., Women's Equity 
Action League v. Cavazos, 879 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Women's Equity Action 
League v. Bell, 743 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983) (en bane), cert. dented, 465 U.S. 1021 (1984); Adams v. Mathews, 536 
F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Adams v. Califano, 430 F. Supp. 118 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 
Adams v. Weinberger, 391 F.Supp. 269 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Adams v. Richardson, 656 
F. Supp. 92 (D.C. Cir.) affd en bane, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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discrimination, thereby delaying attainment of the very goals 
the court's authority had been originally invoked to secure. As 
the history of Adams amply demonstrates, judicial intervention 
can not only reduce an agency's effectiveness, but may even 
facilitate the imposition of a more conservative political 
agenda. The most ardent champions of Adams, although loath 
to assume responsibility for what has happened, now 
grudgingly acknowledge the insufficiency of judicial 
intervention: "[T]he sad story is that despite fifteen years of 
litigation, the nonenforcement continues."7 While "OCR's 
failure to aggressively enforce the civil rights laws extends 
backwards to its inception in the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare [HEW], it appears that the Reagan 
Administration severely worsened this agency's enforcement 
record, despite close monitoring by the Federal courts and the 
Congress."8 How the plaintiffs' legal victories strengthened the 
hand of their political and ideological opponents within OCR 
and its implications for the study of judicial competence are the 
subjects of this discourse. 
II. THE INELUCTABLE MARCH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act forbids racially 
discriminatory behavior in any program or activity receiving 
federal funds. 9 The Department of Education (formerly HEW) 
has primary responsibility for its enforcement with respect to 
educational institutions. If voluntary compliance with the 
provisions of Title VI cannot be secured, enforcement may be 
accomplished either by terminating further assistance and/or 
prosecution by the Department of Justice (DOJ) or any other 
means authorized by law. Infuriated by Attorney General 
Mitchell and HEW Secretary Finch's July 3, 1969 decision to 
"minimize the number of cases in which it becomes necessary 
to employ the particular remedy of a cutoff of federal funds," 
7. Investigation of Civil Rights Enforcement by the Department of Education. 
Hearings before the House Committee on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 84 (1985) (statement of Elliot C. Lichtman, counsel for the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund (LDF) in Adams). [hereinafter 1985 Civil Rights 
Hearing]. 
8. Investigation of the Civil Rights Enforcement Activities of the Office for Civil 
Rights U.S. Department of Education. Majority Staff Report of the House Committee 
on Education and Labor, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1989) [hereinafter Majority Staff 
Report]. 
9. Section 602 codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976). 
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the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) filed suit. 10 In the eyes 
of most observers, the Nixon administration's new enforcement 
strategy (prosecution by DOJ) was merely a ploy to mask its 
abandonment of civil rights: 
The Nixon administration has been the most guilty of vacillation, 
inconsistency and weakness . . . . [T]he [new] desegregation 
procedures . . . amounted to a blueprint for failure. The 
[Mitchell/Finch] statement deemphasized the technique that had 
proven best at achieving school desegregation in recalcitrant school 
districts (HEW fund cutoffs), and adopted a technique that had 
proven bankrupt before (individual negotiations with school boards 
backed by litigation brought by [DOJ]. 11 
In its complaint, the LDF alleged that OCR had done 
nothing to halt the flow of federal funds to school districts and 
systems of higher education which the agency itself found 
continued to segregate and discriminate on the basis of race. 12 
The LDF's real objective, however, was not to terminate federal 
funding, but to alter the dynamics of OCR's compliance 
negotiations with state and local officials. Convinced that the 
"threat of losing federal money is a greater stimulus to 
corrective action than prosecution by DOJ," the LDF advocated 
a judicially mandated timetable for the initiation of fund 
termination proceedings to make "the carrot-voluntary 
compliance-effective."13 
The termination of federal funding would have injured 
those students (blacks) and universities (predominantly black 
institutions) most dependent upon federal aid. To terminate 
federal funding to every public institution of higher education 
in Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and 
Virginia (the ten Adams states whose entire systems of higher 
education OCR had previously concluded were in violation of 
Title VI) or the 525 or more school districts cited in the LDF's 
complaint was politically impossible. 14 No President would 
10. Brief for Appellant at 5, Adams v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 636 (D.C. Cir. 
1972) (No. 3095-70) (reprinted in Majority Staff Report at 200) supra note 8. 
11. C. BULWCK & H. RODGERS, JR., LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 99 (1972). 
12. Brief for Appellant, Adams v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 636 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(No. 3095-70) (reprinted in Majority Staff Report supra note 8, at 192-224). 
13. 198.5 Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 7, at 11. 
14. In 1980, Judge Pratt ordered OCR to negotiate higher education 
desegregation plans with Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, South 
Carolina, Texas and West Virginia. 
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ever have permitted OCR to deny so many state universities 
and school districts access to federal funds; had the Secretary 
of HEW or the Director of OCR attempted to do so, he would 
have been fired. 15 But once OCR's hands were tied by the 
judiciary (or so the LDF assumed), the capacity of the White 
House to impede the enforcement of Title VI would be 
diminished, and OCR's negotiating posture would be so 
strengthened that state and local educational officials would 
have no choice but to capitulate. 
Title VI required OCR to thoroughly explore the possibility 
of voluntary compliance prior to the initiation of any 
enforcement proceedings. Although no timetable for the 
completion of this process of consultation and negotiation was 
outlined in the statute itself, the judiciary need only conclude 
that OCR had abused its discretion and correct the legislature's 
oversight by fashioning one of its own. Judicial supervision 
would then be limited to monitoring OCR's compliance with the 
time frames. At the time, it was difficult to imagine a more 
prudent example of judicial intervention, or an approach to the 
administration of civil rights policy more respectful of the 
integrity of the bureaucratic process. "The timeframes came 
into being as the demonstrably necessary and least intrusive 
means of bringing HEW ... into compliance with Title VI ... 
[T]his Court's timeframe order has ... represented an exercise 
of judicial restraint."16 
No jurist sympathetic to civil rights would decline to strike 
a blow against racial discrimination when the improprieties 
were so obvious and the remedy (a timetable for securing 
voluntary compliance) was so simple. Judge Pratt, who has 
been the presiding judge in Adam._c;, need not even "dictate the 
substantive result of any agency proceedings."17 By creating a 
timetable for the initiation of enforcement proceedings, one 
might even argue that the court was merely doing its best to 
make sense of a poorly drafted statute. Ordering OCR to 
withhold further funding from those whom OCR itself had 
already concluded were in violation of federal law was no abuse 
of judicial power; the right of a court to require an agency to 
abide by its own rules and regulations is among the canons of 
15. L. PANET'l'A & P. GALL, BRING Us TOGETHER: THE NIXON TEAM AND THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS RETREAT (1971); J. CALIFANO, GOVERNING AMERICA 254-57 (19R1). 
16. Brief for Appellant at 3, Adams v. Bennett, 675 F. Supp. 66R (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
17. ld. at 39. 
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administrative law. 18 As Mary Levy, co-counsel for the LDF, 
observed, "Adams is really just a simple matter of 
administrative law."19 
Was the omission of a timetable for the completion of 
voluntary negotiations an oversight? Would the desegregation 
of public education have been accomplished more quickly if 
OCR had adopted the enforcement strategy advocated by the 
LDF, i.e. swift and simultaneous initiation of fund termination 
proceedings? In a follow-up to their original study, Bullock and 
Rodgers20 discovered to their surprise that "the poorest 
districts were the most willing to forego federal aid."21 
"[A]ctual denial of federal funds proved to be largely ineffective 
in Georgia. While some, and perhaps many, districts 
desegregated rather than lose federal revenue, forty-two 
districts (twenty-two percent of the state's total) preferred loss 
of federal funds to desegregation. Of these, all but one refused 
to file a desegregation plan even after the fund cutoff." In 
Region IV, which includes Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina and 
Tennessee, fund cutoffs were effective only twenty-five percent 
of the time.22 Critics of the Mitchell/Finch statement have 
accused the Nixon administration of orchestrating a civil rights 
retreat.23 But the record is more complicated; Bullock and 
Rodgers, for example, criticize OCR's civil service personnel, 
and by implication, the civil rights community as well, for its 
"steadfast refusal . . . to acknowledge the success of the 
statewide suits years after they had been used."24 In 1969 (the 
same year the Mitchell/Finch statement was issued), DOJ filed 
suit against recalcitrant school districts in Georgia, even 
waiving the usual ten day notice given to defendants in such 
cases, to block their access to state educational funds. 25 
18. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. 
et al., 488 U.S. 204 (1988). 
19. Author's interview (May 29, 1988). 
20. Harrell R. Rogers and Charles S. Bullock III are professors of political 
science specializing in policy implementation. They are the authors of several 
studies assessing HEW's efforts to promote school desegregation. 
21. C. Bullock & H. Rodgers, Jr., Coercion to Compliance: Southern School 
Districts and School Desegregation Guidelines, 38 J. PoL. 987, 1004 (1976). 
22. C. BULLOCK & H. RODGERS, JR., COERCION TO COMPLIANCE 50, 90 (1976). 
23. See, e.g., L. PANETTA & P. GALL, BRING Us TOGETHER: THE NIXON TEAM 
AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS RETREAT (1971); G. 0RFIELD, MUST WE Bus? 242-58, 285-97 
(1978); but cf R. NIXON, THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON 43fi-45 (1978). 
24. BULLOCK & RODGERS, JR., supra note 22, at 93. 
25. BULLOCK & RODGERS, JR., supra note 21, at 992. 
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Thereafter, every one of them "submitted desegregation plans 
acceptable to the courts."26 
Adams was never a simple matter of administrative law. 
Under the guise of administrative law, OCR eventually became 
a ward of the court, and for nearly twenty years was denied the 
right to determine its own enforcement priorities, or to modify 
them to incorporate the lessons of experience. In the name of 
civil rights, and at the behest of the LDF, the federal judiciary 
adopted an interpretation of Title VI contrary to Congress' 
intent.27 The enforcement procedures outlined in Titlf' VI are 
extraordinary. If voluntary negotiations fail to produce an 
agreement, OCR may either transfer the case to DOJ for civil 
prosecution, initiate fund termination proceedings before an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), or pursue any other means 
authorized by law. If an ALJ rules in OCR's favor, the order 
announcing the fund cutoff must be signed by the President 
himself, and full reports must be submitted to all relevant 
House and Senate committees. Even then, funds cannot be 
terminated until thirty days after submission of these reports, 
presumably to give Congress time to take whatever action it 
deems appropriate. If funds are terminated, the defendant is 
entitled to a formal hearing before the Washington, D.C. 
Circuit Court. It is difficult to imagine a more cumbersome 
procedure, or one less likely to inspire terror in those accused 
of discriminatory behavior. 
No administration wants to terminate federal assistance, 
and every administration has tried to delay the actual 
termination of funds as long as possible.28 But if "[t]here has 
been bipartisan anathema to employing even the threat of fund 
termination by initiating the administrative enforcement 
process when voluntary negotiations fail,"29 it is not because 
Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush and their 
appointees have no regard for civil rights, but because political 
pressure or the anticipation of political pressure (much of it 
emanating from Congress) to postpone the interruption of 
funds is enormous.30 Nor is every delay in the initiation of 
26. BULLOCK & ROGERS, JR., supra note 22, at 51-52. 
27. J. RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS: How PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS PUBLIC 
POLICY 147, 149-51, 163 (1989). 
28. Interview with Frank K. Krueger, Director, Enforcement Division, Policy 
and Enforcement Service, Office for Civil Rights, Department of Education (August 
29, 1990). 
29. 1985 Civil Rights Hearings,supra note 7, at 11 (statement of Julius L. 
Chambers, LDF). 
30. F. Farmer, Selling the Adams Criteria: The Response of OCR to Political 
76] CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY ADMINISTRATION 
fund termination proceedings a pretext for nonenforcement. 
Finally our findings also provide some insight into the enforcement 
approach that was most efficacious in bringing about Southern 
desegregation. OCR's strategy of leaving until last most of those 
districts in which greatest opposition was anticipated seems to have 
been correct. By using their limited resources to negotiate 
desegregation plans in less resistant districts, OCR made important 
inroads against white obstinacy. Even small first steps away from 
complete segregation in a district were psychologically significant. 
Also for districts which had not yet begun desegregation, the 
compliance of neighboring systems probably showed other 
superintendents that the process was feasible and made it more 
acceptable to the public. In addition, OCR's later strategy of 
bringing severe coercion against selected recalcitrant districts to set 
examples for other foot-dragging communities was seemingly 
effective. Seeing the implications of continued non-compliance, many 
districts decided to capitulate.31 
83 
Had Congress required OCR to initiate fund termination 
proceedings in accordance with a specific timetable, "the 
enforcement approach that was most efficacious in bringing 
about Southern desegregation"32 would have been illegal. The 
simultaneous denial of federal funds to so many states and 
districts would have solidified local opposition, strengthened 
the influence of those members of Congress who opposed OCR's 
efforts to promote school busing, complicated the task of 
desegregating the nation's schools, and (if Congress had 
responded by amending Title VI) diminished OCR's statutory 
authority to combat discrimination in the future. 33 
In 1974, not long after Judge Pratt's 1973 order 
establishing time frames for the initiation of Title VI 
enforcement proceedings was unanimously upheld by the D.C. 
Circuit sitting en bane, eight states submitted plans to 
eliminate the vestiges of racial discrimination in their systems 
of higher education. The LDF was ecstatic, its faith in the 
power of the judiciary to effect social reform confirmed. 34 But 
its victory was hollow, and its celebration premature. The LDF 
was forced to return to court again, and again, and again to 
request additional relief. Further relief was necessary because 
Intervention in Adams v. Califano, 22 How. L. J. 419-25 (1979). 
:31. BULLOCK & RODGERS, JR., supra note 22, at 67. 
82. ld. 
88. RABKIN, supra note 27, at 154, 15R. 
84. SOUTHERN EDUCATION FOUNDATION, ENDING DISCRIMINATION IN HlliHER 
EDUCATION: A REPORT FROM TEN STATES (1974) [statement of Jean Fairfax, LDF]. 
84 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1993 
"soon after these 1973 rulings [the LDF] learned that [OCR] 
was continuing its practice of extensive delays."35 To make 
matters worse, the higher education desegregation plans 
accepted by OCR were unsatisfactory. Contrary to the LDF's 
expectations, Judge Pratt's order intensified the political 
pressure upon OCR to produce an agreement within the time 
allotted by the court, thereby strengthening the hand of the 
states and prompting OCR to accept desegregation plans it 
would otherwise have rejected.36 Wary of the political 
consequences of initiating enforcement proceedings, OCR 
backed down, accepting plans which the LDF itself later 
characterized as totally deficient, and inconsistent with OCR's 
own desegregation criteria. 37 
When the Ford administration finally initiated fund 
termination proceedings against Maryland, the state 
successfully filed suit to enjoin the proceedings. OCR gave 
Maryland sixty days to appropriate additional funds for the 
desegregation of its system of higher education, a time frame 
the Federal district court in Maryland deemed "outrageous" 
since the legislature "was not in session during any part of the 
sixty day period."38 When Maryland officials wrote OCR to 
inquire where to find the black students required to satisfy 
OCR's statistical desegregation criteria, they were advised to 
"recruit" ("raid?") black students from other states, a proposal 
thoroughly at odds with the premise underlying OCR's original 
determination of liability, that the state was obligated to 
increase the number of its own black high school graduates 
enrolling in its own system of higher education. 
One of the reasons it took OCR so long to take action 
35. Brief for Appellant at 30, Adams v. Bennett, 675 F. Supp. 668 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
36. RABKIN, supra note 27, at 174. 
37. Brief for Appellant, Adams v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 269 (D.C. Cir. 
1975). "In response to the court order, all but 2 of the 10 states submitted plans 
in 1974 which OCR promptly rubber stamped" (1985 Civil Rights Hearings, supra 
note 7, at 25) (statement of Elliot C. Lichtman). David Tatel (Director of OCR 
during the Carter administration) still believes that the time frames were helpful. 
"But I do think that in the civil rights area, that the court-ordered timeframes are 
quite helpful primarily because these are difficult issues. They are politically 
sensitive issues and it's very easy for an administrative agency to duck them and 
the court-ordered timeframes, I believe, significantly motivated the agency and I 
also believe they helped the agency gain compliance from recipients of federal 
funds" (quoted in Brief for Appellant at 37, Adams v. Bennett, 675 F. Supp. 668 
(D.C. Cir. 1987). 
38. See Mandel v. United States Dep't of Health, Educ., and Welfare, 411 F. 
Supp. 542 (D. Md. 1976). 
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against state systems of higher education accused of 
discriminatory behavior was that OCR had no idea how to 
desegregate higher education. OCR's proceedings to terminate 
federal funding to Maryland were enjoined, in part, because 
"the defendants have never specified and, in fact, consistently 
refused to specify actions which plaintiffs could take in order to 
facilitate compliance with Title VI."39 OCR learned its lesson; 
when negotiations failed to produce a settlement in Louisiana, 
OCR referred the matter to DOJ for civil prosecution instead. 
To justify promulgation of the timeframes, the LDF argued 
and Judge Pratt agreed that Title VI requires OCR to 
investigate and resolve every complaint received alleging racial 
discrimination emanating from an Adams state unless it is 
"patently frivolous," a standard so strict that virtually no 
complaint may be summarily dismissed.40 Possible violations 
of Title VI are typically identified in one of two ways: by 
investigating the complaints filed by individuals alleging 
discriminatory behavior; or alternatively, by conducting a 
compliance review, a comprehensive, on-site investigation 
initiated by OCR itself, and designed to ferret out evidence of 
systemic discrimination. Prior to the intervention of the court, 
the bulk of OCR's resources were assigned to its compliance 
reviews, and as a consequence, many of the complaints filed 
with OCR were never investigated. 
Less than a year after the time frames were established, 
OCR filed a motion for relief, arguing that it did not have 
sufficient personnel to investigate every Title VI complaint of 
racial discrimination emanating from the Adams states, and 
still fulfill its statutory obligation to investigate and rectify 
discriminatory behavior on the basis of sex, national origin and 
handicap in educational institutions receiving federal funds. 
OCR's request to modify Pratt's First Supplemental Order was 
denied. The LDF argued, and again the court agreed, that 
Title VI's prohibition against the discriminatory use of Federal 
funds was categorical, that insufficient personnel was no 
excuse for selective enforcement.41 The denial of investigatory 
39. Mandel v. U.S. Department of HEW, 411 F. Supp. 542, 547·!'i6 (D. Md. 
1976). 
40. Interview with Frank K. Krueger, Director, Enforcement Division, Policy 
and Enforcement Service, Office for Civil Rights, Department of Education (Aug. 
29, 1990). 
41. Adams v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 269 (D.C. Cir. 197!'i). OCR's inability to 
obtain additional staff was due to a government wide hiring freeze (NARRATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE ADAMS LITIGATION FROM OCTOBER 19, 1970 TO DECEMBER 29, 
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and prosecutorial discretion was the linchpin to the litigation. 
If OCR had the right to decide which complaints to investigate 
and which violations to prosecute, there would be no basis for 
judicial intervention. Had the court chosen to intervene 
anyway, the fiction that Adams was merely a matter of 
administrative law would have come to an end, and the court 
would have been obliged to announce criteria for determining 
the Agency's enforcement priorities. Judge Pratt, however, 
could hardly be expected to keep abreast of OCR's ongoing 
caseload to determine which complaints were sufficiently 
serious to warrant further action. 
Seizing upon OCR's admission that it was unable to fulfill 
its statutory responsibility, and determined to retain, and if 
possible expand, their share of administrative resources, the 
Women's Equity Action League (WEAL), the first of several 
women's groups to intervene in Adams, and the Mexican 
American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF), requested 
permission to join the suit as plaintiff-interveners in 1976. In 
the following year, a similar request was filed by the National 
Federation of the Blind. Judge Pratt denied WEAL's request to 
intervene, which was overturned on appeal, noting that a suit 
challenging the adequacy of OCR's enforcement of Title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibiting discrimination 
on the basis of sex in all educational programs receiving federal 
assistance was already pending in Federal court.42 Judge 
Pratt, although he never said so, may well have wondered 
about the wisdom of imposing additional burdens upon an 
agency whose resources were already being taxed to the limit. 
But how could WEAL be excluded from the suit? The statutory 
language prohibiting racial discrimination was virtually 
identical to the language prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of gender. To make matters worse, Brown v. 
Weinberger,43 a suit challenging OCR's enforcement activities 
in non-Adams states was consolidated with Adams in 1977 
swelling OCR's mandatory caseload even further. 
1977 at 9. Anonymous manuscript obtained from the D.C. office of the NAACP 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund) [hereinafter Narrative History]. 
42. Investigation of Civil Rights Enforcement by the Office for Civil Rights at 
the Department of Education. 24th Report of the House Committee on Government 
Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. fi (1985) [hereinafter 198.5 f:ivil Rights Report]. 
"[S]ome regions had even notified complainants by letter than their complaints 
could not be processed because of the diversion of resources to meet the Adams 
requirements." Narrative History, supra note 35fi, at lfi n.3R. 
43. 417 F. Supp. 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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In 1977 the plaintiffs returned to court, complaining that 
OCR ''had permitted the accumulation of a backlog of hundreds 
of unresolved complaints, and ... wide-ranging violations of 
the time frame requirements."44 OCR, the plaintiffs argued, 
although no longer guilty of deliberate nonenforcement, had not 
tried hard enough to secure authorization from Congress for 
the additional personnel necessary to comply with Judge 
Pratt's time frame order. To ensure that OCR had sufficient 
staff to process all complaints within the time frames 
mandated by his decree, the plaintiffs asked Judge Pratt to 
order HEW to request additional funding, and if Congress 
declined to act, exhorted him to order the Congress to 
appropriate the funds required. Although Judge Pratt agreed 
that OCR had "not taken every feasible step to obtain resources 
which would facilitate coming into compliance with [his] order 
of June 14, 1976," he declined the plaintiffs invitation to order 
Congress to increase OCR's budget; instead, he ordered OCR to 
request additional personnel, and called upon the parties to 
negotiate a settlement. In his Consent Order of December 29, 
1977, the parties readopted "without major changes" the time 
frames already in place (twenty-five procedural steps, each 
with its own time frames), and stipulated that henceforth 
additional data (to verify OCR's compliance with the time 
frames) would be collected and transmitted to the plaintiffs 
semiannually. OCR made some progress, but by 1980 it again 
found itself unable to meet the 1977 time frames (eighty-eight 
percent of its 225 compliance reviews and sixty percent of its 
Letters of Finding were behind schedule, not to mention a 
backlog of 170 complaints, some as old as nine years) 
prompting the plaintiffs to come before Judge Pratt yet again 
to request further relief. The court, siding with the plaintiffs, 
strengthened rather than vacated, as the government had 
requested, its 1977 order.45 
The court and the plaintiffs were now committed to two 
propositions: the denial of investigatory and prosecutorial 
discretion, and the necessity of judicially mandated time 
frames. 
The Adams and WEAL orders require [OCR] to handle every 
complaint that they get. Because the groups and individuals that we 
44. 1985 Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 7, at 16. 
45. 1985 Civil Rights Report, supra note 42, at 5-6; Narrative History, supra 
note 41, at 13. 
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represent place a major emphasis and importance on investigating 
those complaints, it takes an enormous amount of courage ... to 
step forward and file a complaint, and to have that 'deep six'd' is a 
very cruel injustice.46 
"I agree with my colleagues here. You have to handle every 
individual complaint ... "47 And similarly, "the time frames 
are indispensable to vindicate the central purpose of 
Title Vl."48 "From the first, court-ordered time frames have 
been critical tools to secure enforcement of ... basic civil rights 
laws .... "49 
Ill. A PYRRHIC VICTORY 
To their dismay, the plaintiffs in Adams have found it 
necessary "to go back to court continuously . . . to try to get 
[OCR] to comply with its responsibilities . . . "50 As 
Congressman Weiss, a New York Democrat, observed: "The 
testimony we have heard portrayed policies of lax enforcement 
in every administration, Democrat and Republican."51 OCR, 
according to its critics, cannot be trusted to carry out its 
mandate to prevent the discriminatory use of Federal funds. 
But why not? 
OCR's ineffectiveness during the Nixon, Ford and Reagan 
administrations is usually attributed to the presence of 
individuals unsympathetic, if not hostile, to the civil rights 
laws they were supposed to enforce.52 No one, however, would 
46. 1985 Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 7, at 77 (testimony of Marcia 
Greenberger, WEAL). 
47. !d. at 80 (testimony of Michael Landweher, Disability Rights Education and 
Defense Fund, Inc.). 
48. Brief for Appellant at 36, Adams v. Bennett, 675 F. Supp. 668 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
49. Investigation of Civil Rights Enforcement by the Department of Education. 
1987: Hearings before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Operations 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, lOOth Cong., 1st 
Sess. 53 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Civil rights Hearings] (statement of Marcia 
Greenberger). 
50. 1985 Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 7, at 91. 
51. Id. at 149. 
52. C. WILLIAMS, THE BLACK/WHITE COLLEGES: DISMANTLING THE DUAL SYSTEM 
OF HIGHER EDUCATION 20-21 [U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Report] (1981); U.S. 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 3 THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT 
EFFORT-1974 213 (1975). Most of OCR's personnel were decidedly pro-civil rights. 
For example, officials at OCR leaked information to the LDF to assist them in 
their lawsuit. Title VI required that aid be terminated to the discriminatory 
program only. OCR interpreted this provision broadly to permit termination of 
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accuse the Carter administration's appointees, Joseph Califano 
(Secretary of HEW), David Tatel (Director of OCR), and 
Cynthia Brown (Deputy Director of OCR) of indifference to civil 
rights. Secretary Califano was not only a long-time friend of 
Joseph Rauh (counsel for the LDF in Adams), but "[d]uring his 
first week in office ... announced ... [that] there had been 'too 
much data collection and too little enforcement."'53 Director 
Tatel was a prominent civil rights attorney both prior and 
subsequent to his service at OCR. Deputy Director Brown was 
a civil rights attorney specializing in higher education, and 
prior to her appointment, active in the Leadership Conference 
on Civil Rights and the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights 
under Law. When Judge Pratt invalidated the higher education 
desegregation plans accepted by OCR in 1974 and ordered the 
agency to prepare "criteria specifying the ingredients of an 
acceptable higher education desegregation plan," it was Tatel 
who labored to create an atmosphere conducive to the formal 
adoption of the bulk of the LDF's proposed desegregation 
criteria.54 Califano advocated the targeted deferral of funds in 
North Carolina should the state fail to propose an acceptable 
plan for desegregation of its higher educational system (a 
remedy originally proposed by the LDF). Tatel's trip to North 
Carolina in the company of the press to compare conditions at 
the predominantly black institutions (PBis) and predominantly 
white institutions (PWis) prompted Governor Hunt to declare 
how "his heart aches when [he] sees some of the buildings 
those children have to go to school in,"55 ·and eventually, to 
agree to a $40 million capital program for the PBis, the 
expansion of their course offerings, and the suspension of any 
new programs at the PWis which might hinder the state's 
desegregation effort-an agreement subsequently rejected by 
the Board of the University of North Carolina. None of this, of 
course, deterred the LDF from moving to cite Califano for 
contempt for his agency's failure to meet the time frames. 
"Rauh moved so often to have me cited for contempt that 
funds to the entire school district. These, and other examples of OCR's 
commitment to civil rights and the agency's activistic disposition are discussed in 
J. Rabkin, Office for Civil Rights, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 318-19, 329, 
333, 338 (1980); RABKIN, supra note 27, at 151-53, 179; G. ORFIELD, supra note 21, 
at 236-38. 
53. ORFIELD, supra note 23, at 317. 
54. Interview with Mary Levy, attorney with Lichtman, Trister and Levy, 
counsel of record for the Adams litigation, (May 29, 1988). 
55. CALIFANO, supra note 15, at 255. 
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Griffin Bell sent me a hacksaw 'in the event of 
incarceration."'56 
OCR "was under so many court-imposed deadlines for so 
many contradictory enforcement tasks that virtually no staff 
was available for any fresh policy initiative. One of the ironies 
of the situation was that some of the new enforcement officials 
were the very civil rights lawyers who had worked so hard to 
wrap their Nixon and Ford administration predecessors in a 
straitjacket of judicial decrees. Now they found themselves 
unable to move . . . "57 When Tatel asked the court for more 
time to comply with the time frames, the court denied his 
request. 
During his tenure in office, Secretary Califano never 
terminated anyone's funds, and in five instances took no action 
despite ALJ rulings in OCR's favor. 58 To the plaintiffs, 
Califano's reluctance to proceed was proof of his abandonment 
of civil rights. But such a characterization is ludicrous; if 
neither judicial intervention nor the election of an 
administration favorably disposed to civil rights is sufficient to 
overcome the obstacles to fund termination, then the 
explanation for OCR's behavior probably lies elsewhere. Both 
President Carter and Vice-President Mondale (certainly no 
enemy of civil rights) pressured Califano to delay the initiation 
of enforcement proceedings against North Carolina's system of 
higher education. 59 Fund termination is simply too drastic a 
remedy, especially when the "violations" are equivocal (e.g., the 
underrepresentation of minorities in higher education) or the 
remedy (e.g., busing) exceedingly unpopular, to be politically 
feasible. 
Too much was expected of OCR. OCR was asked to expand 
the scope of its Title VI higher education investigations by 
collecting data on the names and dates of all minority students 
contacted, the number of minority applications received, the 
cultural diversity of university course offerings, and minority 
utilization rates for campus housing, counseling and tutorial 
assistance. OCR was asked to investigate the adequacy of 
remediation and retention programs nationwide; to become a 
56. CALIFANO, supra note 15, at 254. 
57. ORFIELD, supra note 23, at 317. 
58. Interview with Frank K. Krueger, Director, Enforcement Division, Policy 
and Enforcement Service, Office for Civil Rights, Department of Education (August 
29, 1990). 
59. CALIFANO, supra note 15, at 255-56. 
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repository of specific, technical advice on how to increase 
minority enrollment, retention and employment; to mandate 
the establishment of faculty affirmative action goals; to review 
the adequacy of the criteria employed by universities to 
determine the job availability of minority employees; to require 
validation of all employment selection criteria, and to monitor 
the development of specific performance criteria; to increase the 
number and scope of its compliance reviews; to review the 
compliance record of one-fourth of all federal contractors per 
year; to authorize no aid beyond its capacity to monitor 
compliance; to deny access to federal funds until all complaints 
currently pending against a university have been investigated 
and resolved, etc. ''Pressed by so many claims for relief, from so 
many different groups, in such varied forms, the Office became 
almost paralyzed."60 
In the beginning, OCR was reluctant to initiate Title VI 
enforcement proceedings against state systems of higher 
education accused of discriminatory behavior. Lethargy, 
however, is sometimes the better part of valor. OCR had no 
idea how to compare the quality of the physical plant at the 
PBis and PWis, and consequently it needed the cooperation of 
state officials to devise and execute a building utilization 
analysis. 61 Leon Panetta, while Director of OCR, was 
flabbergasted when the President of Arkansas AM & N (PBI) 
rejected his agency's proposal to exchange AM & N's four-year 
educational program for a series of two-year technical programs 
offered at a nearby PWI. "Why [should we] emasculate our 
college in favor of another?"62 AM & N's president asked. 
Unfamiliar with higher education, it never occurred to OCR to 
consider the prestige of the programs to be exchanged. The 
program exchanges it initiated between the PBis and PWis in 
the name of racial desegregation often failed to produce the 
results promised, usually to the detriment of the PBis. In 
Georgia, for example, Savannah State University (PBI) 
60. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 52, at 216-18, 228-33, 235-
39, 242-43, 247-51, 261, 288, 298, 367-71, 390-93; A. Block, Enforcement of Title VI 
Compliance Agreements by Third Party Beneficiaries, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 14 
(1983); 1985 C:ivil Rights Hearings, supra note 7, at 29; 1985 Civil Rights Report, 
supra note 42, at 6; Interview with Phyllis McClure, Division of Legal Information 
and Community Service, NMCP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, D.C. Office 
(May 31 and June 1 of 1988); J. CALIFANO, supra note 15, at 226. 
61. Interview with Terrence Peii, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, Office 
for Civil Rights, Department of Education (June 1, 1988). 
62. PANE'f'I'A & GALL, supra note 15, at 320. 
92 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1993 
exchanged its education program for Armstrong State's (PWI) 
business program. Total enrollment at Savannah State fell 
from 2,500 in 1978 to 1,500 students in 1979, although by 1989 
it had climbed back to about 2,000 while the gain in black 
enrollment at Armstrong State proved temporary, disappearing 
as soon as those blacks previously enrolled at Savannah at the 
time of the exchange completed their degrees. 63 Since 
enrollment is a crucial variable in most state funding formulas, 
the PBis suffered financially from the desegregation remedies 
imposed by OCR. 
Doubtful of its competence and mindful of its political 
vulnerability, OCR was unusually slow to take action. To the 
LDF, however, its tardiness in terminating funds was evidence 
of a conspiracy to sabotage enforcement of Title VI. OCR's 
reply, that more time was required, that voluntary compliance 
was being sought in a complex and unfamiliar arena, fell on 
deaf ears. Blinded by their passion for justice, neither the LDF 
nor Judge Pratt paid any attention to the complexity of the 
agency's mission, or to the political and administrative 
obstacles to its attainment. Instead, civil rights enforcement 
was portrayed as a battle between the forces of light (the civil 
rights lobby) and the forces of darkness (Nixon, Ford, Carter, 
Reagan, and their political appointees) with nary a shade of 
gray. 
In fact, the principal obstacle to compliance with the time 
frames was OCR's devotion to the cause of civil rights. This 
was particularly true during the Carter administration when 
officials at OCR were enamored with the prospect of 
establishing new civil rights precedents. Complaint 
investigations were less exciting than compliance reviews-a 
threat to the agency's activist agenda, consuming valuable staff 
time which in the absence of the court order might have been 
assigned more profitably to the investigation of other matters. 
Despite the Adams order, the Carter administration increased 
the annual number of compliance reviews required of each 
investigative officer. "OCR's compliance reviews result in twice 
as many remedies and benefit six times as many victims of 
discrimination as its complaint investigations."64 
63. Data on Savannah State and Armstrong State's enrollment was obtained 
from Georgia State officials; the results in Florida were similar, see I. Tribble, 
Desegregation of Higher Education: A Public I Private Cooperative Alternative in, 
DESEGREGATING AMERICA'S COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 94 (1988). 
64. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS 
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To clear house, Harry M. Singleton, Assistant Secretary for 
Civil Rights during the Reagan administration, transferred 
OCR's oldest and most intractable cases to DOJ for civil 
prosecution where they languished for some time, due in part 
to bad relations between himself and Bradford Reynolds, 
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. Singleton 
reorganized OCR, and instituted new management techniques 
designed to enhance the agency's capability to process 
complaints in accordance with the time frames. 65 Since fifty-
four percent of the complaints received by OCR involve 
allegations of discrimination against the handicapped (e.g., a 
parent who disagrees with the school's placement of their 
child),66 and since these complaints tend to address a 
relatively narrow band of issues requiring analogous remedies, 
OCR was able to streamline its procedures so that the 
resolution of subsequent complaints raising the same issue 
became less time-consuming.67 The additional staff time 
required to comply with the court order was secured by 
deemphasizing compliance reviews, and by adopting new 
administrative procedures designed to narrow the scope of the 
compliance reviews undertaken by the agency. Pressure was 
then applied to OCR's ten regional offices to impress upon 
them the importance of meeting the time frames: "[A]ll you 
need to do is talk to some of my senior officers and my regional 
directors and they'll tell you the gray hairs they've gotten over 
the pressure that I [Singleton] put on them to comply [with the 
Adams order] ."68 And indeed, the pressure to comply was so 
intense that: 
the union which represents OCR employees [went] on record 
requesting that OCR management lessen the strict deadlines all 
OCR employees have to adhere to in their performance plans ... 
[arguing that the] timeframes are too strict and impossible to 
meet .... [OCR has] responded to the union indicating that the 
timeframes are dictated by the court and are not within OCR's 
prerogative to adjust. 
Managers at OCR's regional offices were reportedly told that 
ENFORCEMENT BUDGET 1983 16 (June 1982). 
65. 198.5 r:ivil Rights Hearings, supra note 7, at 115-17. 
66. Majority Staff Report, supra note 8, at 84. 
67. Interview with Terrence Pel!, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, Office 
for Civil Rights, Department of Education (June 1, 1988). 
68. 198.5 r:ivils Rights Hearings, supra note 7, at 118. 
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"anyone causing them to miss an Adams timeframe was going 
to get it."69 
As a result of these efforts, the average age of pending 
complaints was reduced from 1,297 days at the end of fiscal 
1982 to 174 days at the end of fiscal 1986-a decline of eighty-
seven percent.70 By 1987, only seven percent of the complaints 
filed with OCR were missing at least one Adams time frame 
despite a significant reduction in staff (from 1,099 in 1981 to 
807 in 1987) and the annual return of substantial unspent 
funds (from a low of $832,000 in 1982 to a high of $2,694,000 
in 1984) to the Treasury.71 Officials at OCR were jubilant: 
"The Education Department has a fantastic record as far as 
enforcement actions are concerned. All you have to do is look at 
the statistics .... We've eliminated a backlog of cases. We've 
reduced the average age of complaints ... and I'm not hearing 
any praise.'m And indeed, as OCR's record improved the 
praise became increasingly faint. 73 
OCR's efforts to comply with the time frames were greeted 
with derision. Marcia Greenberger of WEAL accused OCR of 
"trying to get out of the court order, beefing up its record before 
the court, to make it appear that they are complying with the 
court order ... .''74 Staff for the House Committee on 
Education and Labor complained that OCR was now 
interpreting the time frames too strictly, thereby putting too 
much pressure on its regional "staff to close cases without 
in-depth investigations and with possibly inadequate 
settlements." Several regional staff members even admitted to 
"encourag[ing] complainants to withdraw their complaints or 
'clarify' their allegations in order to narrow the scope of their 
complaints.''75 Substantive monitoring of closed cases to verify 
implementation of the remedial action agreed upon by the par-
ties was sporadic. 
69. 198.5 Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 7, at 118; 198.5 Civil Rights Report, 
supra note 42, at 28-30; 1987 Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 49, at 26fi, 270, 
339, 345. 
70. 198.5 Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 7, at 2, 98-99; Majority Staff Report, 
supra note 8, at 35. 
71. 198.5 Civil Rights Report, supra note 42, at 101-2, 114. 
72. 198.5 Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 7, at 113. 
73. Note, e.g., the omission of any allusion to OCR's compliance with the time 
frames in 198.5 Civil Rights Report, supra note 7, at 35. 
74. Civil Rights Enforcement by the Department of Education, Hearing Before a 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of 
Representatives, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 248 (1987). 
75. Majority Staff Report, supra note 8, at 4, 27. 
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[T]here are investigators who indicate that they fail to monitor 
because the process is too lengthy, or because the Adam.•> time 
frames, which apply to cases in the investigative stages, militate 
against expending valuable time monitoring closed cases, as case 
monitoring is not subject to the time frames. Thus monitoring cases, 
when there are others in the investigative pipeline which are 
governed by Adams and are therefore conferred higher priority 
status, may be viewed as compromising an investigator's record for 
adhering to deadlines.76 
95 
The time frames have hampered efforts to deploy OCR 
personnel in a way calculated to serve national civil rights 
priorities efficiently by giving too much weight to narrowly 
based grievances. More importantly, they have given officials at 
OCR a mechanism for reining in the activities of the agency's 
permanent civil service. "To the extent that any enforcement 
has occurred, it has occurred in spite of OCR's leadership, by a 
regional staff that remained loyal to the objectives implicit in 
the civil rights statutes which the staff were mandated to 
protect."77 
Harry Singleton was understandably proud of the Reagan 
administration's civil rights record: 
We terminated Federal financial assistance to a school district. We 
did that in 1982. You know the last time that was done was 1972. 
The great saviors of civil rights during that period from 1977 to 
1980-81, they never brought an enforcement action that went to 
fruition. They never terminated anyone's Federal financial 
assistance. But, yet, they talk about our lack of nerve and fortitude 
in going forward with enforcement action.78 
According to its critics, however, OCR has consistently failed to 
investigate civil rights violations thoroughly; and yet, according 
to these same critics, OCR's investigative reports are too 
76. 1985 Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 7, at 248; Majority Staff Report, 
supra note 8, at 4, 41; Interview with Phyllis McClure, Division of Legal 
Information and Community Service, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 
D.C. Office (May 31 and June 1 of 1988). 
77. Majority Staff Report, supra note 8, at 6. This is the same regional staff 
who were previously denounced for illegally backdating Letters of Finding in order 
to meet the Adams time frames. For publicity purposes, the plaintiffs deliberately 
exaggerated the significance of the practice. In most instances, the deadlines were 
missed by no more than 1-6 days. It is difficult to understand why one should be 
so indignant about this matter if the Reagan administration were indeed guilty of 
interpreting the time frames too strictly (1987 Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 
49, at 33-37, 247-92). 
78. 1985 Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 7, at 113. 
... 
96 B. Y. U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1993 
long. 79 Lengthy reports are necessary to protect OCR in the 
event of subsequent litigation. Regional staff have complained 
that they were forced to investigate frivolous cases (only 
patently frivolom, cases may be dismissed without a formal 
investigation).8° For example, a staff member allegedly spent 
one week on-site investigating a complaint filed by a parent of 
a handicapped child against his school's mascot, a pirate 
wearing an eye patch; the school was accused of discrimination 
against the handicapped-the eye patch, sexual 
discrimination-pirates often took advantage of their female 
captives, and racial discrimination-pirates participated in the 
slave trade.81 
The plaintiffs' frustration with the civil rights record of the 
Reagan administration is understandable. Having repeatedly 
denied that Adams is an attempt to dictate the actual terms of 
settlement, the civil rights community can hardly contest the 
adequacy of OCR's prescription for resolving a specific 
complaint.82 Having insisted that every complaint is entitled 
to a thorough investigation, it is difficult to object when OCR, 
in deference to the court's time frame order, allocates its 
limited resources accordingly in spite of its deleterious effect 
upon OCR's capacity to discover and remedy civil rights 
violations of more significance to more people. It is somewhat 
ironic that the only administration to make satisfaction of the 
time frames its number one priority was so vehemently 
denounced for its failure to take seriously the enforcement of 
civil _rights. Even more ironic that officials of the Reagan 
administration by virtue of their success in meeting the time 
frames were less vulnerable than the Carter administration 
(ostensibly more sympathetic to civil rights) to the threat of a 
contempt citation. The discerning reader will not be surprised 
to discover that the day after Judge Pratt vacated his Adams 
orders (overturned on appeal in 1989, and then dismissed once 
again for want of cause of action in 1990), LeGree S. Daniels, 
Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, sent a memorandum to 
OCR's regional staff indicating that all procedures and time 
frames previously mandated by the court were to remain in 
79. 1987 Civil Rights Hearings. supra note 49, at 60. 
80. Majority Staff &port, supra note 8, at 34. 
81. ld. 
82. 198.5 Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 7, at 18-23, 29-49, 126-27; Brief for 
Appellant at 39-40, Adams v. Bennett, 675 F. Supp. 668 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
I 
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effect.83 Despite the dismissal of the Adam.r.; suit, the Bush 
administration is still following the time frames, and still 
investigating every complaint received although an agency task 
force was recently established to consider modifying the time 
frames and restoring the agency's investigatory and 
prosecutorial discretion. 
IV. REFLECTIONS ON THE PERILS OF JUDICIAL AcTIVISM 
Convinced it had nothing to lose and exasperated by OCR's 
timidity and inertia, the LDF filed suit. Title VI was 
misinterpreted, and the effectiveness of fund terminations 
exaggerated in order to convince the court of the legitimacy and 
efficacy of its intervention. The court was told what it wanted 
to hear, despite the availability of evidence to the contrary, 
that the executive branch was the principal, if not the only, 
obstacle to the timely and vigorous enforcement of Title VI. 
Yet, on more than one occasion Congress enacted legislation to 
express its displeasure with OCR's behavior, restricting OCR's 
capacity to mandate school busing for purposes of racial 
desegregation (the Byrd Amendment), forbidding deferral of 
federal funding for new programs to school districts suspected 
of racial discrimination, reassigning half of OCR's enforcement 
personnel to the investigation of Northern discrimination, and 
closing a loophole in the Byrd Amendment exploited by 
Secretary Califano. "In 1966 the most liberal House since the 
depression voted against the HEW school desegregation 
program," and by 1975, the Congress, at least according to 
Senator Humphrey, was "ready to destroy the only existing 
machinery for systematic enforcement of ... the constitutional 
rights" of school children attending segregated schools.84 In 
numerous instances, the threat of Congressional opposition was 
sufficient to prompt OCR to back down. Given the scope and 
depth of congressional opposition to OCR's efforts to promote 
school busing, OCR's enforcement of Title VI was surprisingly 
energetic. 85 
Had the court been more political, it might have realized 
83. Majority Staff Report, supra note 8, at 11. 
84. ORFIELD, supra note 23, at 238-39, 273. 
85. ld. Orfield chastises the Nixon administration for its failure to enforce 
Title VI. And yet, the evidence he amasses concerning the scope and depth of 
Congressional opposition suggests that even a President who wanted to enforce 
Title VI more vigorously would have been thwarted by Congress. 
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that the promulgation of its time frame decree would only 
weaken OCR's negotiating position. Title VI's fund cutoff 
provisions are a powerful weapon, but like the atomic bomb, 
their impact is too great and opposition to their use too 
formidable to constitute a credible threat, at least in the 
absence of extraordinary provocation. 86 It was naive to believe 
that threatening the Adams states with the loss of all federal 
funding for public higher education would be sufficient to bring 
about parity in black/white undergraduate, graduate and 
professional school attendance and retention rates within five 
years, and yet this is precisely what the LDF maintained. OCR 
was caught bluffing, sometimes even threatening to terminate 
funds despite its inability to gather sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate in a court of law the existence of the civil rights 
violations complained of.87 By promulgating a timetable of its 
own, the court exposed OCR's bluff. 
Had Judge Pratt endeavored to dictate OCR's enforcement 
priorities and manage the allocation of its institutional 
resources, the novelty of Adams, its affront to the separation of 
powers, would have been obvious. And yet, this is precisely 
what happened, albeit by default and under the cover of 
administrative law. By denying OCR investigatory and 
prosecutorial discretion, OCR lost the ability to determine its 
enforcement priorities and manage the allocation of its 
institutional resources. In order to investigate every complaint 
received within the allotted time frame, OCR was forced to 
reduce the number and scope of its compliance reviews. Today, 
roughly eighty percent of OCR's resources are devoted to 
complaint investigations, resulting in a finding of "no violation" 
more than 57% of the time, an utterly inefficient allocation of 
agency resources. At the behest of the judiciary, OCR became a 
small claims court for civil rights, an agency whose primary 
activity (complaint investigations) is of no consequence more 
than half the time; and even when it is, the scope of most 
complaints is so limited that fewer Americans now benefit from 
the violations it corrects. Although· created under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, OCR spends most of its time addressing the 
rights of the handicapped. The court's denial of prosecutorial 
86. CALIFANO, supra note 15, at 252-57; See Interview with Frank Krueger, 
supra note 58 (stating political appointees are under extraordinary pressure not to 
cutoff funds in the absence of overwhelming provocation). 
87. J. RABKIN, Office for Civil Rights, in, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 341, 
344 (1980). 
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discretion diminished OCR's capacity to combat racial and 
national origin discrimination. 88 Thereafter, OCR's 
enforcement priorities were determined by chance, or rather, by 
the civil rights community's most sophisticated and vocal 
members-the parents of handicapped children. No agency has 
unlimited resources, and consequently discretion is an essential 
component of administrative efficiency. District attorneys 
sometimes decline to prosecute; plea bargaining is used to 
reduce the strain upon the legal system. And yet in Adams, the 
court was unable to recognize the desirability of conceding 
investigatory and prosecutorial discretion to an agency subject 
to similar constraints. 
TABLE 189 
PERCENTAGE OF COMPLIANCE REVIEWS AND COMPLAINT 
INVESTIGATIONS 
RESULTING IN A FINDING OF NO VIOLATION BY TYPE AND BASIS 
FY 1983 - FY 1988 (THROUGH 5/6/88 ONLY) 
BASIS OF COMPLIANCE COMPLAINT 
INVESTIGATION REVIEW INVESTIGATION 
Race 44.9 84.9 
National Origin 46.0 74.8 
Sex 23.4 48.2 
Handicap 18.3 49.5 
Multiple Bases 29.9 70.4 
Total 27.3 57.8 
The reasonableness of the time frames was never verified 
empirically. The LDF argued in testimony before Congress that 
the time frames were reasonable, otherwise the Ford, Carter 
and Reagan administrations would never have agreed to 
them. 90 "These negotiations were protracted and intensive ... 
The result was a carefully crafted agreement . . . which 
encompassed compromise on each side and reflected OCR's two 
and one-half years of experience under the time frames."91 
According to Cavanagh and Sarat, the "threat of a remedy 
fashioned by a judge" encourages the parties to the litigation to 
88. J. RABKIN, supra note 27, at 169. 
89. Majority Staff Report, supra note 8, at 81, 97. 
90. 1985 Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 7, at 83. 
91. Brief for Appellant at 32, Adams v. Bennett, 675 F. Supp. 668 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
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negotiate with one another, resulting in "a mutually agreeable 
course of remedial action" and thereby, reducing the need for 
judges with "the training and expertise to devise appropriate 
solutions."92 But in Adams the threat of a judicial remedy did 
not lead to a reasonable compromise. A negotiated settlement 
need not alleviate the need for judges with "the training and 
expertise to devise appropriate solutions" if one of the parties 
has greater cause to doubt the court's competence. Judge Pratt 
had already denied OCR's request to modify the time frames. 
According to one of OCR's negotiators, it was a victory merely 
to maintain "the previously existing internal time frames."93 
To justify judicial activism, the plaintiff needs a simplified 
theory of causation, lest he cast doubt upon the capacity of the 
court to devise a suitable remedy. The critics of Horowitz's 
critique of judicial competence presume that we can count on 
either the defendant, the judge, or other interested parties to 
bring to the attention of the court any information relevant to 
the litigation, but omitted by the plaintiff. But OCR could 
hardly be expected to acknowledge the political pressures to 
which it was subject, or their effect upon the agency's ability to 
terminate access to federal funds. What would have happened 
if the LDF had instituted legal proceedings, requiring the 
Johnson administration to explain why its enforcement efforts 
were largely confined to non-urban school districts with small 
minority populations? Would OCR have been able to explain 
why it had yet to do anything to combat segregation in urban 
school districts with substantial minority populations? Would 
the judiciary have understood why OCR needed to make 
psychological inroads against white obstinacy by negotiating 
desegregation agreements with less resistant districts first? 
Would the court have dismissed such arguments as self-serving 
pretexts for nonenforcement? With respect to higher education, 
OCR argued in its brief that more time was required, that 
voluntary compliance was being sought in a complex and 
unfamiliar arena. 94 Should OCR have tried to explain that it 
had no idea how to desegregate higher education? That its 
negotiations with Louisiana, for example, were complicated by 
the state's apparent readiness, if pressed too far, to merge its 
PWis and PBis, to the detriment of the latter? 
92. Cavanagh & Sarat, supra note 4, at 406. 
93. Narrative History, supra note 41, at 14, 17. 
94. Brief for Appellee at 19-24, Adams v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 636 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972). 
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Critics of judicial activism usually chastise the court for 
being too political; but perhaps the problem is that courts are 
not political enough. Their approach to social policymaking may 
be too abstract to do justice to the politics of policymaking, to 
the political, social, administrative and psychological 
constraints which govern its formulation and constrain its 
execution. 95 The discretion necessary for successful 
policymaking may be abused; but the denial of sufficient 
investigatory and prosecutorial discretion is no less fraught 
with difficulties. The LDF went to court, because individual 
lawsuits are inefficient, and "often do not address systemic 
patterns of discrimination or promote institutionwide 
remedies."96 But surely the same could be said of the 
complaints such individuals now file with OCR instead.97 
95. M. Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 POL. THEORY 379, 387 (1981). 
96. 1985 Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 7, at 3. 
97. In 1990 the D.C. Circuit sitting en bane dismissed Adams for want of cause 
of action. Weal v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742 (1990). According to the court, Title VI 
may no longer be enforced by suing OCR itself. If an individual believes OCR's 
enforcement of Title VI is inadequate, his only option is to sue the offending 
institution itself. 
